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IN THE SUPREME COURTf OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
CASE NO.

WILLIAM ROBERT PILKEY,

860154

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The three following issues are presented on appeal in the
above entitled case:
1.

Whether Appellant William Robert Pilkey was entrapped

by an undercover agent employed by the Box Elder Sheriff's
office, and therefore would not have been convicted of any
crime.
2.

Whether Appellant William Robert Pilkey should have

been charged, convicted, and sentenced for a lesser included
class B misdemeanor offense rather than a second degree felony,
3.

Whether Appellant Pilkey1s due process rights were

violated as a result of prejudicial error during the course of
the trial warranting a reversal of his conviction and the
granting of a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Undercover agent, Miss Sonie Rector, first came into
contact with Mr. Pilkey shortly after her arrival in Tremonton,
Utah, and engagement by the Box Elder County's Sheriff's office
on September 23, 1984.

(R. 27)

As soon as she started

frequenting Mr. Pilkey's club, she began developing a
relationship with him (R. 28, 117, 121) and initiated discussion
about drugs.

(R. 52, 105)

Although Mr. Pilkey was never under suspicion of using or
dealing drugs (R. 95), Miss Rector began requesting that Mr.
Pilkey get her "something to keep her awake" and appealed to him
numerous times with persistent requests to help her out.

She

did everything whe could to convince him that she was in
desperate need of "something to keep her going".

(R. 72)

She

called him practically everyday in her campaign of harassment
and pleading.

Between September 23, and November 9, 1984, she

telephoned Mr. Pilkey approximately 35 times.

While during the

two-week period between October 16 and November 9, 1984, she
came into Mr. Pilkey's club at least ten times to request his
help in getting something to keep her going.

(R. 49-54, 90, 111-

114, 127, 137, 142-143)
Prior to the commencement of her attempt to get Mr. Pilkey
to obtain drugs for her, she flaunted her other high-money drug
dealing.

(R. 118)
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The event for which Mr. Pilkey was tried took place on
November 8 and 9, 1984.

He was charged by way of information

with violating Section 58-37-8 of the Utah Code Annotated (as
amended), in that he accepted a gun from Miss Rector, the
undercover agent, in exchange for an uncontrolled substance sold
legally over-the-counter called ephedrine or caffeine pills.
(R. 16)

Miss Rector had obtained the gun from the Sheriff's

office for use as a decoy and initiated discussion of the gun
and the possible exchange.

(R. 64, 70)

Mr. Pilkey was brought to trial on June 17, 1985, was
convicted of a second degree felony, and was sentenced to five
years in prison on July 29, 1985.

Defendant's counsel filed a

Motion for Arrest of Judgment on August 2, 1985, and a Motion
for a New Trial on August 5, 1985, both subsequently denied,
requesting a new trial on the grounds that (i) Defendant should
have been charged and tried under the lesser included offense
set forth in Section 58-37b-4 or in the alternative to be
sentenced thereunder according to a class B misdemeanor, and
(ii) Defendant was denied his due process rights as a result of
prejudicial error during the trial.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defense of entrapment is defined by Section 76-2-303 of
the Utah Code Annotated (as amended) and the cases interpreting
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that statute.

Courts are required to employ an objective test

which focuses on the police conduct and not the propensities or
predisposition of the defendant.

Indications that entrapment

has occurred include initiation and proposal of the illegal
activity by the agent, persistent requests by the agent, the
development of a close personal relationship with the defendant
with the purpose of inducing illegal activity to obtain evidence
for prosecution, and no prior suspicions of similar activities
by the defendant in the past.

In this case, where all of these

factors were present, Appellant Pilkey was entrapped by
undercover agent Sonnie Rector.

He therefore should not have

been convicted of any crime and his conviction should be
overturned.
In the event that Mr. Pilkey's conviction is not
overturned, the charge, conviction, and sentencing of Mr. Pilkey
should have been under the lesser included offense, a class B.
misdemeanor rather than a second degree felony.

The Court has,

on more than one occasion, ruled that where two statutes with
different penalties cover the same act, the violator is entitled
to the lesser punishment.

Appellant's sentence should therefore

be reduced to comport with the lesser penalty.
During the course of the trial, Mr. Pilkey!s attorney
specifically requested, in the Judge's chambers, that the fact
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of a prior charge against Mr. Pilkey for illegal gambling not
be raised during testimony.

The Judge ruled that such evidence

should not be submitted to the jury.

(R. 152)

Despite this

ruling by the Judge, at least one juror reported that she had
based her vote for conviction on the Defendant's past gambling
charge.

This is prejudicial error and warrants a reversal and

the granting of a new trial for the Defendant.
ARGUMENT
I
APPELLANT PILKEY WAS ENTRAPPED BY AN UNDERCOVER AGENT AND
THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE CONVICTED OF ANY CRIME
Section 76-2-303 of the Utah Code Annotated (as amended)
defines the defense of entrapment as occurring
when a law enforcement officer or person directed by or
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial
risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person
an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute
entrapment.
Cases interpreting this statute have further clarified the
definition of the entrapment defense.

In State v. Taylor, 599

P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), the defendant was convicted for the crime
of distributing for value a controlled substance.

The Utah

Supreme Court reversed the convicition and held that the defense
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of entrapment was avilable where:

the defendant and the

undercover agent had cohabited prior to the alleged offense and
remained close friends after they separated; they had injected
heroin together; they had shared a bed during the month the
agent had contacted the defendant to request that he obtain
heroin for her; and the defendant could empathize with the
agent, who pleaded for assistance in obtaining the substance.
In Taylor, the Court specifically rejected a subjective
test that would look into the predisposition of the defenant to
commit the offense, and adopted the objective view of
entrapment.

Under the objective test, the focus is not on the

propensities of the defendant, but on whether the police conduct
falls below standards for the proper use of government power.
The objective test denies the use of decoys, such as a gun in
our case, to present actively, inducements for the purpose of
luring a person into the commission of an offense.

The

government is not permitted to engage in the manufacture of
crime.

Id_ at 500.

If the intention that the particular crime be committed
originates with the police, then the defense of entrapment is
avilable.

_Ic3 at 501.

No matter what the defendant's past

record and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to
which he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain police
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conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated
by an advanced society.

Permissible police conduct does not

vary according to the particular defendant concerned.
502.

Id_ at

Some of the action that indicate entrapment by a police

agent include appeals to sympathy, pity or friendship, pleas of
illness, the possibility of exorbitant gain, inordinate
inducements, and the use of methods of persuasion or
inducements.

Ijd at 502-504.

The Court in State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980),
employing the newly-adopted objective test, reversed a jury
conviction, and held that reasonable doubt existed as to whether
the offense committed, distribution of a controlled substance,
was a product of the defendants initiative, or was induced by
persistent requests of an undercover agent.
In Kourbelas, as in the case at bar, the agent initiated
discussion of the selling of marijuana.

The agent, after

telling defendant that there could be money to be made, asked
the defendant if he could get some or if he knew some way of
getting some.

When defendant said "I'll see what I can do", the

agent asked for his name, address, and telephone number, and
defendant told the agent to get in touch.

Within the next

month, the agent called defendant six times asking about the
marijuana.

Finally, the defendant called the agent, after
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repeatedly telling the agent that he was trying, informed the
agent that two pounds were available and sold them to the
agent.

_Id at 1239.

The Court stated that the following facts were significant
in determining that the defense of entrapment was available:
(i) the agent first suggested the purchase; (ii) the agent
renewed contact to ask again and called the defendant at least
five times in attempting to purchase the substance; (iii) and
there was no evidence that the defendant had previously
Id_ at 1240.

possessed or dealt in the drug.

In the case at

bar, all of these facts are present, as can be seen from the
recitation of the facts above and a reading of the transcript of
the trial in the district court.

In fact, additional evidence

was given, that Miss Rector, undercover agent, had established a
personal relationship with Mr. Pilkey and had evoked his
sympathy by telling him that she was in desperate need of
something to keep her going.

She even told Mr. Pilkey that she

had had to resort to the use of horse pain killer and had shot
it into her veins. (R. 113)
Another case substantially similar to Kourbelas, is State
v. Sprague, 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984), in which the Court also
reversed a conviction, because the defendant had been induced by
an undercover agent to obtain for him and sell him a controlled
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substance.

The Court reflected on the similarities of the two

cases and stated that it was the agent who first approached the
defendant, with no reason to believe that the defendant used or
sold drugs, and suggested the purchase.

The agent reinitiated

contact, and finally after a third request by the agent, the
defendant provided the substance.

Defendant testified that he

did this because he wanted to be a friend to the undercover
agent.

Id_ a t

40

6.

The most recent cases on entrapment, State v. Erickson, 722
P.2d 756 (Utah 1986), and State v. Udell, 45 U.A.R. 7
(10/28/86), are distinguishable from the Kourbelas and Sprague
and the present case, and support Mr. Pilkeyfs view that he was
entrapped by Miss Rector.

In these two most recent cases, no

personal relationship had been established, the defendant had
invited the agent to his office in Erickson, and the defendants
in both cases were known to the police as people who had
previously been involved with the illegal use and/or sale of
controlled substances.
Since the facts of the case against Mr. Pilkey are directly
analogous to those in the cases cited above where the Court
reversed conviction in similar situations, and all of the
elements of the defense of entrapment are present,
conviction should be reversed.
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his

II
APPELLANT PILKEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED, CONVICTED, AND
SENTENCED UNDER THE STATUTORY PROVISION FOR
A LESSOR INCLUDED OFFENSE
Appellant Pilkey was charged by way of information with
having violated Section 58-37-8 of the Utah Code Annotated (as
amended), in that he allegedly negotiated to distribute a
controlled substance for value and then distributed another
substance, ephedrine or caffeine pills, in lieu of that
substance.

He was tried, convicted of a second degree felony,

and sentenced to five years in prison.
Appellant's alleged crime is also covered by U.C.A.,
Section 58-37b-4, which provides that "[i]t is unlawful for any
person to ... distribute ... an imitation controlled substance.
Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of a class
B misdemeanor and upon conviction may be imprisoned for a term
not exceeding six months, fined not more than $299, or both".
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that when an
individual's conduct can be construed to be a violation of two
overlapping statutes, the statute with the lesser penalty should
apply.

State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969);

State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450 (Utah 1984).

In State v. Crick, 675

P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983), the Court stated, in passing, that it
recently had "affirmed the principle that a defendant may be
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convicted of a lesser included offense even where the lesser
offense has not been charged and the defendant has not requested
such an instruction", and cited State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 145
(Utah 1983) for the proposition.
In Hill, the defendant appealed a jury conviction of theft
by deception, a second degree felony, under U.C.A. Section 76-6405.

He had received cash from an undercover agent in exchange

for an ounce of baking soda that he had represented as "good
cocaine".

The Court held that by exchanging the baking soda for

money, the defendant had committed the distribution of an
imitation controlled substance under U.C.A., Section 58-37b-4 as
a class B misdemeanor, the same section under which the
Appellant in this case should have been sentenced.
Chief Justice Hall, in his dissent, objected to the
decision that baking soda was a contemplated imitation
controlled substance under the statute.

He cited the Prefatory

Note to the Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act, after
which our statute is patterned, and explained that "the clear
thrust of the Act is to reach dealers who sell tablets ... that
'clearly resemble or even duplicate the appearance of wellknown, brand name controlled substances, but which contain only
non-controlled over-the-counter drugs such as caffeine,
ephedrine, ... or some combination of these substances1."
at 45.

(emphasis addedj
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Hill

As such Defendant was over charged and if any conviction is
upheld it would be for the lesser offense as defined in 58-37b-4U.C.A.
Ill
AS A RESULT OF PREJUDICIAL ERRORr APPELLANT WAS DENIED
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED
AND A NEW TRIAL ORDERED
Prejudicial error has been interpreted by the Utah Supreme
Court to mean that error is reversible if the Court is persuaded
that without the error there was a "reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result for the defendant."

State v. Fontanaf 680

P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984).
During the course of the trial, Appellant's counsel
requested, in chambers, that the Judge order the State not to
raise the issue of Appellant's prior misdemeanor gambling
charge.

The Judge agreed and even recognized the damaging

nature of such testimony.

Later in the trial, the State cross-

examined Mr. Pilkey about the reason why his club had been
closed, to which Defendant's attorney objected.

(R. 133)

It is

Appellant's contention that the State's attorney knew of the
extensive local publicity about the closing of Mr. Pilkey's club
and was giving the opportunity to the jury to presume that Mr.
Pilkey was lying about the reason for the closing.
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Appellant's view is further supported by the affidavit of
his attorney, submitted together with his Motion for New Trial,
dated August 5, 1985, in which Mr. Brady attests that he was
informed that at least one juror based her vote for conviction
on the fact that the Defendant had been charged with gambling
and that was why his club was closed.
There is a reasonable likelihood that Appellant would not
have been convicted if the prejudicial error had not occurred.
Appellant was convicted because at least one juror based her
decision on a matter that was ruled out of order and possibly
prejudicial by the Judge.

Therefore, Appellant's due process

right to a fair trial was violated, and his conviciton should be
reversed and a new trial granted.
IV
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant asserts that he was entrapped by an
undercover agent and therefore he should not have been convicted
of any crime.

If his defense of entrapment is rejected,

Defendant/Appellant has demonstrated that he should have been
sentenced under the lesser included offense of a class B
misdemeanor.

He has also shown that prejudicial error occurred

during the course of the trial which would warrant the reversal
of his conviction.
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Defendant/Appellant respectfully submits that his
conviction be reversed or in the alternative that this case be
remanded with an order that he be sentenced for a class B
misdemeanor rather than a second degree felony.
DATED this

day of January, 1987.

DOUGLAS M. BRADY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
300 South Main Street
P.O. Box 465
Logan, Utah 84321

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief for Appellant to, David L.
Wilkinson, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, and one (1) copy to Jon J. Bunderson, 45 North First
East, Brigham City, Utah 84302, Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Respondent, postage prepaid this

day of January,

1987.

Ranell Johnson - Secretary
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ADDENDUM
BARRETT & BRADY

1

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
3 0 0 SOUTH MAIN STREET

2

P O. B O X 4 « S

L O G A N . U T A H 84321

3

(801)733-4000

4
5

Attorneys for

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
6
7

THE STATE OF UTAH,

9
10
11

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS M. BRADY

Plaintiff,

8

NO.

vs.
WILLIAM ROBERT PILKEY,
Defendant.

12
STATE OF UTAH

)

13
ss.
14
COUNTY OF CACHE

)

15
16
Douglas M. Brady, being first duly sworn and deposed,
17
states:
18
1.

That I am the attorney of record in this matter.

2.

That I am competent to testify as to the facts in this

19
20
21
22
23
24

matter if called to trial.
3.

That after the trial in the instant cause of action, I

had a conversation with Kenny Adams, one of the Detectives from
the Sheriff's Department who worked on this case. That
Detective Adams informed me that one of the jurors had told them

25
that they had convicted Bob Pilkey due to the fact that they
26
-15-

1

knew the license for the Hide-a-way Club previously operated by

2

the Defendant had been revoked due to his conviction on a
3

Misdemeanor Gambling charge.
4

4.

That there was no evidence before the court pertaining

5

to the Misdemeanor Gambling charge and as such the juror has
6

relied upon improper evidence to sustain their verdict.
7

DATED this 5th day of August, 1985.
8
9
10

Douglas M. Brady

11

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5th day of August,
12

1985.
13
14

Notary Public
15

Residny At;

Commission Expires

16
17

CERTIFICATE
18

I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct
19

copy of the foregoing Affidavit to Jon Bunderson, 45 North First
So 20
1

•* 2

East, Brigham City, Utah this 5th day of August, 1985.
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